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Date of Incident

1 Jan 2015 - Ongoing

Publication Date

03 Jul 2021

Commissioned By

Self-Initiated

Collaborators

None
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Play Video: Digital Violence: How the NSO Group Enables State Terror
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Visit the DIGITAL VIOLENCE platform here.

Listen to a sonic interpretation of the data by Brian Eno.

First detected in 2015, the NSO Group’s Pegasus malware has reportedly been used in at least 45 countries worldwide to infect the phones of activists, journalists and human rights defenders. Having learnt that our former collaborators and close associates were hacked by Pegasus, Forensic Architecture undertook 15 months of extensive open-source research, interviews assisted by Laura Poitras, and developed bespoke software to present this data as an interactive 3D platform, along with video investigations narrated by Edward Snowden to tell the stories of the individuals targeted and the web of corporate affiliations within which NSO is nested. Supported by Amnesty International and the Citizen Lab, our analysis reveals relations and patterns between separate incidents in the physical and digital sphere, demonstrating how infections are entangled with real world violence, and extend within the professional and personal networks of civil society actors worldwide.

NSO Group Technologies Ltd. was founded in Israel in 2010 by Niv Carmi, Shalev Hulio and Omri Lavie. Part of an ecosystem of Israeli cyber-weapons companies—developed in the context of its ongoing occupation and settler-colonial surveillance of Palestinians—NSO’s Pegasus malware has reportedly been used since at least 2015 in at least 45 countries worldwide to infect the phones of activists, journalists and human rights defenders.

Forensic Architecture’s interest in the NSO Group dates back to 2017, when reporting by The Citizen Lab revealed that members of Centro Prodh, our collaborators in investigating the disappearance of 43 students from Ayotzinapa, Mexico, had been hacked using Pegasus.

The investigation into NSO Group began two years later, when Forensic Architecture learnt that our close associates, members of the legal team leading a suit against NSO on behalf of a number of human rights defenders, were informed by WhatsApp in 2019 that their phones had also been infected.

While reporting on this issue incrementally exposed new cases of infection, we undertook this project in order to provide the public, researchers and the legal team with a general tool to explore relations among different types of NSO-related activities worldwide.

NSO has yet to confirm a single state or corporate client, and continues to receive security export licences from Israel’s Ministry of Defence for the sale of Pegasus—despite being challenged in Israeli and international courts.

The investigation consists of:

  1. A navigable digital platform,
  2. Video investigations to tell the stories of human rights defenders from around the world reportedly targeted by Pegasus, and
  3. An interactive diagram and video presenting new research into the web of corporate affiliations within which the NSO Group is nested.

With this, Forensic Architecture has for the first time mapped the global landscape of NSO-related activities to demonstrate new connections and patterns between ‘digital violence’ using Pegasus and real-world violence directed at lawyers, activists, and other civil society figures.

The platform

The data for the project is based on fifteen months of open source research that extracted data from hundreds of pages of documents as well as interviews. The Platform offers the most comprehensive database to date (containing over a thousand data points) of the reported infections of the phones using Pegasus.


Forensic Architecture developed bespoke open-source software to present this data as an interactive 3D platform, which will be updated as our investigation continues.

Key finds

The infections enabled by NSO’s Pegasus malware that have thus far been publicly exposed likely form only a part of a more expansive deployment against civil society actors across the world. However, the data collected does already suggest possible patterns in the ways that digital targeting using Pegasus operates:

  1. Digital infections do not target civil society actors as individuals, but rather as networks of collaboration. Our platform shows that in Mexico, Saudi Arabia and India digital targeting (blue dots) starts with one person, before their professional networks are targeted within a similar time period. In each of these examples, the use of Pegasus occurs after or during periods where these civil society networks expose or confront controversial or criminal state policy.
Digital targeting of Carmen Aristegui - Digital targeting of Carmen Aristegui extends later to include her colleagues and son, one month after their major exposure of corruption by the Mexican President.
Digital targeting of Carmen Aristegui extends later to include her colleagues and son, one month after their major exposure of corruption by the Mexican President.
Digital targeting of Nihalsing Rathod - Digital targeting of Indian human rights lawyers Nihalsing Rathod extends to include Shalini Gera and Surendra Gadling, and their associate and client Anand Teltumbde, a Dalit-rights scholar and activist, within the same few months.
Digital targeting of Indian human rights lawyers Nihalsing Rathod extends to include Shalini Gera and Surendra Gadling, and their associate and client Anand Teltumbde, a Dalit-rights scholar and activist, within the same few months.
  1. Digital infections of civil society groups occur alongside other forms of violence experienced in the physical world. Cyber-surveillance is consistently entangled with a spectrum of physical violations, including break-ins, intimidation, assaults, arrests, lawsuits and smear campaigns, and murder, in the case of prominent Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, whose friends and colleagues were targeted by Pegasus.
Digital targeting of Maati Monjib - Maati Monjib’s digital targeting in Morocco (in blue) interlaced with constant forms of  physical violence and psychological intimidation, including against his family and colleagues (in red).
Maati Monjib’s digital targeting in Morocco (in blue) interlaced with constant forms of physical violence and psychological intimidation, including against his family and colleagues (in red).
Expansion of Carmen Aristegui’s digital targeting - Carmen Aristegui’s digital targeting (in blue) in Mexico entangled with break-ins to the offices of Aristegui Noticias, intimidation, lawsuits and smear campaigns (in red).
Carmen Aristegui’s digital targeting (in blue) in Mexico entangled with break-ins to the offices of Aristegui Noticias, intimidation, lawsuits and smear campaigns (in red).
  1. Digital targeting extends the reach of state power to include human rights dissenters in exile, while also physically targeting their colleagues and families in their home country.
Targeting of Omar Abdulaziz - Omar Abdulaziz is targeted using Pegasus while in exile in Montreal, after which two of his brothers are arrested in Saudi Arabia.
Omar Abdulaziz is targeted using Pegasus while in exile in Montreal, after which two of his brothers are arrested in Saudi Arabia.
Targeting of Rwandan activists - All Rwandan opposition activists were living abroad when targeted by Pegasus in 2019, with Faustin Rukundo’s wife having earlier been arrested by Rwandan authorities and held incommunicado.
All Rwandan opposition activists were living abroad when targeted by Pegasus in 2019, with Faustin Rukundo’s wife having earlier been arrested by Rwandan authorities and held incommunicado.

The Pegasus Stories: Interviews with targets

Using data from the platform and first-hand interviews (conducted with Laura Poitras) with reported targets and investigators of NSO’s spyware, Forensic Architecture’s video series, The Pegasus Stories, reveals how digital infections are part of a toolkit of actions targeting the work of civil society around the world.

Pegasus Stories: Pegasus in Morocco - Still from Pegasus in Morocco

Still from Pegasus in Morocco. (Forensic Architecture)

 

Pegasus: Targeting the Investigators - Still from Pegasus: Targeting the Investigators

Still from Pegasus: Targeting the Investigators
Pegasus Stories: Pegasus in Saudi Arabia - Still from Pegasus in Saudi Arabia

Still from Pegasus in Saudi Arabia

 

Pegasus Stories: Pegasus in Mexico - Still from Pegasus in Mexico

Still from Pegasus in Mexico

Narrated by Edward Snowden, the NSA whistleblower and President of Freedom of the Press Foundation, these short films are the first to tell the stories of civil society actors targeted by Pegasus, describing in detail the experience of being surveilled as a personalised terror that exacts a psychological toll within networks of collaboration and friendship as well as their resistance and perseverance in the face of this terror.

Consulting Amnesty International’s report tracking investment in NSO and its corporate structure, along with news sources and leaked financial documents and reports, Forensic Architecture has reconstructed the corporate network within which the NSO Group is nested.


This video investigation reveals how affiliates of NSO Group based in other countries likely enabled the contracting of licences on NSO’s behalf for its spyware, so as to facilitate its access to state markets in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States—countries to which NSO otherwise would not have access.

Saudi Arabia’s 2017 purchase of Pegasus - Saudi Arabia’s purchase of Pegasus in 2017 was reportedly enabled by another of NSO’s affiliate companies—Q Cyber Technologies SARL, based in Luxembourg—after which a purge within Saudi was supplemented with a digital spying campaign in 2018 targeting Saudi dissenters abroad. Analysis of corporate documents provided by Amnesty in this project suggest that Saudi purchases of Pegasus licenses may have been what contributed to Q Cyber’s jump in profits from $24,738,462 in 2016 to $169,214,909 in 2019.
Saudi Arabia’s purchase of Pegasus in 2017 was reportedly enabled by another of NSO’s affiliate companies—Q Cyber Technologies SARL, based in Luxembourg—after which a purge within Saudi was supplemented with a digital spying campaign in 2018 targeting Saudi dissenters abroad. Analysis of corporate documents provided by Amnesty in this project suggest that Saudi purchases of Pegasus licenses may have been what contributed to Q Cyber’s jump in profits from $24,738,462 in 2016 to $169,214,909 in 2019.
UAE’s 2016 purchase of Pegasus - Leaked documents reveal that NSO Group’s affiliate Circles Solutions reportedly enabled the sale of malware to the United Arab Emirates in 2016, with whom Israel had no official connections at the time. Since this reported purchase, the UAE has hacked the devices of dozens of human rights defenders and reportedly developed its own cyberweapons in close collaboration with the Israeli cybersecurity industry.
Leaked documents reveal that NSO Group’s affiliate Circles Solutions reportedly enabled the sale of malware to the United Arab Emirates in 2016, with whom Israel had no official connections at the time. Since this reported purchase, the UAE has hacked the devices of dozens of human rights defenders and reportedly developed its own cyberweapons in close collaboration with the Israeli cybersecurity industry.

These sales appear to be precursors to the normalization of relations with Israel, leading to the proliferation of digital targeting and a rise in human rights violations.

This is consistent with Forensic Architecture’s previous investigation into datasets used to demonstrate NSO Group’s contact-tracing software, Fleming, which also pointed out that the exposed data included location information from Rwanda, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain—all countries in which NSO’s Pegasus spyware was reportedly used, and most of which Israel had no diplomatic ties with at the time.

Methodology

Methodology

Data mining

We data-mined dozens of human rights reports—including Citizen Lab and Amnesty International’s exposure of NSO-related hacks, legal documents, hundreds of news reports from newspapers around the world including the Washington Post, Aristegui Noticias, Vice, The Hindu, The New York Times, Forensic News, The Guardian, Haaretz, Aljazeera amongst others, and more than a dozen interviews conducted with investigators and dissenters, activists, journalists and public figures targeted using Pegasus.

Each data entry point was categorised by the individuals targeted or the organizations they work with, plotted by its time, or time range, according to the documented fields from which Pegasus operates —including Mexico, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Rwanda, India, Spain and Togo.

Data Points were classified as either digital, physical or contextual events. Each of these categories were further refined and sub-categorised:

  • Digital events include suspected and successful Pegasus infections as reported by the Citizen Lab or Amnesty International in the form of either zero-click or one-click exploits, and were subclassified as such.
  • Physical events encompass all incidents of violations in the physical world and are organized along murder (fatal violence or assassination), assault (instances of physical violence), intimidation (violence aimed at causing fear, emotional and psychological distress) and Black Cube (which refers to intimidation specifically enacted by agents of the private Israeli intelligence company, Black Cube).
  • Contextual events are subdivided into: corporate transformations and financial transactions that relate to NSO Group and its affiliates; exposures of NSO related operations (in the form of news articles, civil society reports, petitions and lawsuits); and global, regional or local events surrounding NSO-related digital infections or physical violence, including political or criminal events investigated by the people targeted.

Software development

Following the process of data mining, Forensic Architecture developed an interactive platform to explore the relations between the resulting data points—designed and built to enable in-depth exploration of the logged events.

The platform is built using D3 and WebGL (three.js) with instanced rendering and custom shaders in order to enable the concurrent rendering of thousands of elements on the screen. It enables multi-dimensional filtering of the dataset by:

  • open text search
  • date range
  • fields of operation
  • event types
  • and targeted individuals

Moreover, it allows users to view the data in two or three dimensions and zoom into time by magnifying the horizontal axis.

A custom data-oriented animation system which the platform utilizes for its mode of curated vertical storytelling allows anyone to:

  • subset similar datasets
  • narrativize sequence of data points
  • and highlight specific patterns and relations within them. In the platform, such stories are optionally provided alongside filters in order to provide a starting off point for researchers and users to further engage with the source material.

The produced modules for this platform augment Forensic Architecture’s Timemap ecosystem for spatiotemporal visualizations.

The code for the project will be released in Forensic Architecture’s GitHub.

 

Another prism into the contents of this dataset makes use of sound as an explanatory medium, providing an affective way of experiencing the data. In collaboration with Brian Eno, a custom data-to-sound pipeline was constructed that streamed data points from our database into an audio synthesis engine that played back sound fonts. The sounds that correspond to these events were modulated based on attributes such as temporal fuzziness, and then synchronized with visuals of data points unraveling across time in the platform.

Interviews

Over the past 15 months, and working closely with Laura Poitras, we conducted first-hand interviews remotely with over a dozen reported targets and investigators of NSO’s spyware from around the world. Working under conditions of global lockdowns, these individuals spoke with us and shared their expertise and experiences of digital violence despite knowing the risks of provoking additional surveillance.

Team

Forensic Architecture Team

Forensic Architecture Team
Principal Investigator
Researcher-in-Charge
Data Visualization and Video Editing
Research and Video Editing
Creative Technologist and Audio Programmer
Research Support

Praxis Films

Praxis Films

Supported by

Additional Support

Additional Support

Extended Team

Extended Team
Video Narration
Data Sonification
Sound Editing
Video Editing

Exhibitions

Exhibitions

Events

Events

Press

Press

Press

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