Shireen Abu Akleh: The Extrajudicial Killing of a Journalist | Extended Report

1. Material received from Al Jazeera
2. Material received from witnesses
3. Additional materials used
4. Commissioned photo/video survey
5. Documents

1. Footage
2. Site documentation
3. Video analysis
   1. Synchronization
   2. Footage speed and analysis
   3. Zoom
4. Audio analysis
5. 3D reconstruction
   1. Photogrammetry
   2. Shadow analysis
   3. Geolocation
6. Optics simulation
7. Testimony

1. Al Jazeera footage
2. Bullet image

1. 16 min full video
2. Balcony video 02

1. Telegram_Jenin_Vehicles 1
2. Telegram_Jenin_Vehicles 2
3. Telegram_Jenin_Vehicles 3
4. Telegram_Jenin_Vehicles 4
5. Telegram_Jenin_Vehicles 5
6. Telegram_Jenin_Vehicles 6
7. Jenin_Camp_Shireen_Satellite
8. Tel_hill photo
9. Balcony video 01

1. ALI_shot position
2. SH_shot position-2
3. IMG_0261
4. IMG_0262
5. IMG_0263
6. IMG_0264
7. Tree markings

1. Drone footage of site
2. Ground photography

1. David_Letter_web_210616
2. Government documents
   1. Autopsy report and affidavit
   2. Forensic Lab report and affidavit
   3. Records of evidence
   4. Witness testimonies

1. Bullet

We were provided with Shireen’s autopsy report for the purposes of this investigation. Using the findings in the report, an image of the bullet retrieved from Shireen’s skull ‘bullet image’ (4.1.2) published by Al Jazeera, as well as expert accounts identifying the bullet, we confirmed the bullet as being a 5.56mm bullet with a green tip.²
Through open sources, we identified green-tipped bullets as being M855/SS109 bullets manufactured by IMI (Israel Military Industries). These bullets have shallower ballistic trajectories and higher precision than typical 5.56mm bullets. According to IDF soldiers’ forums, such green tipped 5.56mm ammunition is the standard ammunition for Israeli army marksmen.³
M855/SS109 are longer, and the cartridge has more fire-powder, than a regular bullet. M855 bullets are meant to be fired from a specially-adapted rifle (such as the M4A1 – an M4 rifle adapted for marksmen) equipped with a thicker barrel. The thicker barrel is threaded more densely (7 threads per inch vs 6 threads per inch in a regular M4) to allow the bullet to spin faster as it leaves the barrel. A barrel with more threads makes a bullet spin faster around its axis, thus generating a shallower ballistic trajectory. All of this ensures that the shot is more precise. The thickened barrel is meant to absorb the heat emanating from the increased friction due to the denser threading. These bullets are also reinforced with an internal steel structure.⁴ As a result of these factors, M855 bullets have higher penetrability through body armour and helmets than regular bullets.  

2. Rifle and scope

Open-source research in equipment lists of the Duvdevan paratrooper special unit, the unit reportedly present in Jenin on that day, revealed that marksmen in such units use M4 rifles.⁵ We further research online soldiers’ fora, these confirmed that IDF marksmen use the M4 Carbine and further revealed their M4 carbine’s are commonly equipped with an optical scope in the Trijicon ACOG series with a 4x magnification, likely the 4×32 model (the most common model).⁶
The Trijicon ACOG 4x32mm battle scope, which likely has the same specifications as the scope equipped by the Israeli army marksman, magnifies a scene 4x through a 32mm lens, with a specified field of view of 12.27 meters across the lens at 100 meters away. The scope is designed to be used with one or both eyes open. The specified field of view is perceivable when the lens is 1.5 inches away from the eye (the eye relief specified by the product). The scope is still usable when further away from the eye: this preserves the 4x magnification preserved but the field of view is reduced. A 35mm camera with a 200mm lens replicates 4x magnification given that a 35mm format camera at 50mm focal length correlates to 1x magnification.⁷

1. Synchronization

‘Synchronising’ multiple videos describes a process which temporally aligns them within a single video file thus demonstrating when events depicted in one video chronologically overlap with those depicted in other videos. We synchronised ‘Al Jazeera’ and ’16 min video’ using Adobe Premiere Pro, a video editing software, in order to accurately analyse the incident.


Synchronization of `Al Jazeera` footage (left) and ’16 min video’ taken by Salim Awad (right) using Adobe Premiere Pro. (Forensic Architecture and Al-Haq, 2022)

 

Since we know that ‘16 min video’ was a livestream, we can accurately establish that it began at 6:24 AM. This allowed us to anchor the synchronisation to the real time in Jenin, accurate to the minute. this allowed us to anchor the synchronization to the real time accurate to the minute. ’16 min video’ runs continuously between 6:24:00 until 6:32:05 and again between 6:33:09-6:34:58. ‘Al Jazeera’ begins after the first round of shooting and is continuous between 6:31:10 and 6:34:51. ‘Al Jazeera’ and ’16 min video’ overlap between 6:31:10 – 6:32:05 and between 6:33:09 – 6:34:51.

2. Footage speed and analysis

We examined the videos in ‘slow motion’ to closely studied each frame to break down the actions of all people present in detail. Using Adobe Premiere Pro, we analysed the way in which the incident unfolded frame-by-frame in both ‘Al Jazeera’ and ’16 min video.’

3. Zoom

To analyse the incident closely, we used Adobe Premiere Pro to zoom in on the subjects such that they occupied most of the screen, which allowed us to isolate and better see the elements captured in the footage.

Photogrammetry model with location of armoured vehicle at time of shooting. (Forensic Architecture and Al-Haq, 2022)

 

1. Site

We commissioned a local surveying company to conduct an extensive drone survey of the site and sourced ground photography of the entire length of the road, which allowed us to create a highly accurate 3D photogrammetry model of the site scale. Photogrammetry is a process by which large numbers of still photographs, of an object or environment, can be combined to create a precise and navigable 3D model. Photogrammetry software, such as Metashape, computes distances within a 2D image by a process of triangulation, taking into consideration metadata like the focal length of the lens of the camera that captured the image.¹⁰ Metashape then arranges every pixel from multiple overlapping images in 3D space, creating a ‘point cloud’ made of often hundreds of millions of individual pixels, or ‘points’. This point cloud can be anchored to its location in the real world, through a process known as ‘ground truthing’.¹¹


Photogrammetry software "Metashape" processing 3D model of the site. (Forensic Architecture and Al Haq, 2022)

 

We modified and added elements to this model through photographs and satellite imagery.

2. Photomatching

To precisely model the scene and incident from the footage, we had to first match the position, perspective, and focal lengths of all footage that captures the needed positions of analysis. We refer to the process of reconstructing the position of origin of a piece of footage and creating a simulated camera that matches it to the 3D model as ‘photomatching’ and to a single recreated image and camera as a ‘photomatch.’ Photomatching is a technique developed by Forensic Architecture through a number of investigations.¹² We place the frames of a video inside our digital ‘site’ model of the scene, as a semi-transparent ‘foreground object’ in Blender. Using a ‘camera object’, a virtual parameter inside the software which simulates the view settings of a real camera, we match the same position, angle, and focal length of each footage in the 3D model. Using these simulated cameras in the 3D model, along with the corresponding footage superimposed onto the scene, we are then able to analyse the incident from multiple perspectives, including the positions of and distances between the journalists, the civilians, and the Israeli army vehicle convoy up the road.

3. Scene Scale

At the level of scene, we used video stills from four different perspectives to situate the Israeli army military vehicle convoy. We studied the footage of these vehicles and used open-source research to identify the vehicles and their features. We identified the front and back vehicles as the ‘MDT David Urban Light Armoured Vehicles’. We modelled this vehicle using drawings from the manufacturer’s specifications as well as photographs of its features.¹³ We identified the Wolf Armoured Vehicle and purchased a precise 3D model available online after checking and verifying its precision, so that we could place it within our reconstructed 3D environment as part of the scene scale reconstruction.¹⁴


 

4. Incident Scale

At the level of the incident, we ‘photomatched’ several stills of the incident from the ‘Al Jazeera’ and ‘16 min video’ footage in Blender which capture the position of Shireen and the other journalists present at significant moments throughout the incident.¹⁵ Through these stills, we modelled the position of Shireen, and the others present at the scene.


 

To model the position of individuals that are not captured on footage, we relied on other sources. To model the position of Ali in the moment he was shot, we relied on a 3D comparative analysis interpolating between his positions captured in the footage before and after his shooting, the photographed location of his wound, and his account of the incident delivered to us.

 

To model the position of Shireen in the moment she was shot and the trajectory of the bullet that killed her, we studied her autopsy report, to which we had exclusive access (‎4.6.1). We used this together with the synchronized footage and the 3D reconstruction of the incident, including the last position we see her standing and the first time we see her on the ground.

5. Shadow analysis

For those videos and photographs without metadata, as well as those which contain inaccurate metadata, we determined the time they were captured through a virtual shadow analysis. For each ‘photomatch’ in the 3D modelling software, Blender, we could overlay the matched image with a semi-transparency to allow us to maintain sight of the 3D model. Blender possesses a built-in ability to accurately simulate sunlight of a precise geographic location and time of year. By specifying the location as Jenin and the date as the same as that of the incident, we used our 3D model of the site to simulate the sun’s movement until the shadow of the 3D model matches the position observed in the footage. The match of shadows thus indicates that the footage was captured at approximately the same time, within a five-minute margin of error. Doing this for footages without metadata allows us to verify their occurrence on a timeline of the day of the incident.

1. Digital reconstruction

Our digital reconstruction of the scene includes the precise position of the Israeli army armoured vehicle parked closest to the approaching journalists and its sniper hole. Using this reconstruction, we can simulate the Israeli marksman’s view through the scope of their rifle throughout the incident, including the moments Shireen and Ali were shot. We were able to simulate accurately based on the specifications of the scope which was likely used by the marksman, following research detailed in ‎5.3.2.
In order to model our digital reconstruction, we placed a virtual camera object matching a 35mm camera which accurately simulates the optical magnification of the scope in the identified position of the marksman. To precisely simulate the marksman’s view, we modelled a circle within the software with a diameter of 12.27 meters. This was then placed 100 meters from the camera, and oriented perpendicular to its view. This circle, in this specific position, would occupy the full extent of the scope from the view of the camera: the area not occupied by this disc would be outside the field of view of the marksman. This process allowed us to accurately limit the extents of the view to what the marksman would have seen in their scope in both magnification and extent. We captured this perspective with multiple positions of the journalists and civilians involved including the moments when the shooting began, when Ali was shot, and when Shireen was shot.

2. On-site reconstruction

In order to conduct an analysis at the site of the incident, we took photographs at the site of the incident from the precise position of the Israeli army marksman at the time of the incident in order to reconstruct the view through the marksman’s scope at the instance of each shooting. We recreated the scene by positioning a camera of correlating specifications to the scope with individuals wearing the same ‘PRESS’ vests Shireen and Ali were wearing at the time of the incident at the various exact positions where Ali and Shireen were shot. These photographs were masked to match the marksman’s field of view described in ‎5.7.1. From this analysis we were able to determine the visibility of the journalists to the marksman.

1. The journalists followed standard protocols for self-identification. We determined this through video analysis of the incident and the testimony of Shatha Hanaysha.
   1. In ‘16 min video’, we observe that between 6:30:49 and 6:31:06, when the first round of shooting begins, the journalists (Shireen, Ali, Shatha, Mujahid, Muhannad and Majdi) are walking in the direction of the Israeli army position, moving along the middle of the road, each of them wearing standard press vests with the word ‘PRESS’ written on the front and back of their vests with a dimension of 21.5 cm by 4.5 cm. The journalists are seen wearing plain clothes and not carrying anything in their hands, thus clearly identifiable as civilian non-combatants.
   2. Our interview with Shatha Hanaysha verified the precise steps the journalists took as they approached the Israeli army position, including standing at the end of the road for several minutes. The journalists followed standard practices as carried out by Palestinian journalists in the occupied territory, as well as standard protocols of identification in line with recommendations by UNESCO and Reporters Without Borders.¹⁷ We can confirm Satha’s statement since they are visible, in ‘16 min video’, standing at the end of the road at 06:28:25, 3 minutes before the incident.
2. The shooter was an Israeli army marksman using a standard M4 Carbine equipped, most likely, with a 4x magnification scope. We determined this through open-source research and Shireen’s autopsy report.
   
   M4 Carbine equipped with a trijicon ACOG 4x magnification riflescope
   1. Using Shireen’s autopsy report and open-source research, we identified the bullet retrieved from Shireen’s skull was identified as being a 5.56mm bullet with a green tip. Through a process of open-source research detailed in ‎5.3, we were able to determine that such bullets are standard ammunition of Israeli army marksmen. These bullets are more accurate than regular bullets and, given their increased penetrability, more deadly.
   Bullet retrieved from autopsy is 5.56mm bullet with a green tip, the same bullet used by marksmen

    

   2. The Israeli army convoy was composed of five vehicles, including one at the front and one at the back of the convoy which were parked perpendicular to the road. These two vehicles on the edges of the convoy are armoured, so as to protect them against small fire, and have a ‘sniper hole’ on the side. One of such ‘sniper holes’ faced the road where the journalists were. The placement of the army vehicles (see image below) supports a practice whereby marksmen sit inside such vehicles ‘guarding’ the flanks.
   Front and back IOF armoured vehicles stationed sideways pointing its shooting hole down the road towards the journalists 190m away

    

   3. Using open-source research, we were able to determine that the unit reportedly present in Jenin on the day of the incident, the Duvdevan special unit, is commonly equipped with rifles with an optical scope which magnifies the marksmen’s vision by 4x. This fact, together with the specifications of the armoured vehicles, and the standard positioning protocols of the Duvdevan unit, allowed us to recreate the field of vision of the marksman who was positioned at the north vehicle’s sniper hole. This way, we could analyse what was and what was not visible to them.
3. The journalists’ ‘PRESS’ sign on their vests was clearly visible from the position and through the rifle scope of the marksman both when they began shooting and throughout the incident, including when Ali and Shireen were hit.
   We determined this through reconstruction based on digital modelling, physical reconstruction and optical analysis (as explained in ‎5.7 and ‎5.7.3).
   1. In our digital modelling, detailed in ‎5.7.1, we were able to create a 3D model which accurately reflected the field of vision of the marksman from the sniper hole. Using this reconstruction, with its simulation of the position of the marksman’s rifle scope and its likely magnification, and positioning Shireen and Ali’s digitally reconstructed bodies in the positions and moments when they were shot, we were able to accurately reconstruct the view through the scope in these instances. In these views, Shireen and Ali are clearly identifiable both as journalists – given the size and orientation of their vests, the ‘PRESS’ sign is clearly visible at all times – and visibly unarmed – their hands are within the field of vision of the marksman, and empty.
   Digital reconstruction of the visibility of the journalists as they were walking up the road. As would be seen through the Trij[icon] ACOG 4x32 BAC riflescope. (Forensic Architecture and Al-Haq, 2022)

    

   2. We further conducted a physical reconstruction of the event to verify the digital reconstruction, as detailed in ‎5.7.2, using photographs at the site of the incident from the marksman’s precise position. The photographs were cropped following the mask described in ‎5.7.1, and are an accurate recreation of the view of the marksman at the times when Shireen was fatally shot and Ali, wounded. In these views, as in the digital reconstruction, Shireen and Ali are clearly identifiable as unarmed journalists.
   On site visual reconstruction of Shireen's visibility the moment she was shot. As would be seen through the Trij[icon] ACOG 4x32 BAC riflescope. (Forensic Architecture and Al-Haq, 2022)

    

   3. In the attached video report, we enlarged this view to the height of the video frame to represent the resolution of the marksman’s vision more accurately. To view both digital and optical images at the same relative size as what the marksman would have seen, the images should be viewed on a 27” monitor at full screen with the viewer sat 50cm away. This position would replicate the marksman’s view, through 32mm scope lens placed 1.5 inches from their eye.
   Diagram showing correct viewing distance of images on a 27inch screen, to accurately replicate the view of the marksman at the time of shooting - replicating the 32mm scope lens placed 1.5 inches from their eye.

    

1. Trajectory analysis of the shots fired reveals: (i) a clear line of fire to the group of journalists from the Israeli army position, (ii) close proximity of the shooting’s impact points, and (iii) that all impact points were above shoulder height, together indicating the precise aim of shots with the intention to kill.
   We determined this using 3D reconstruction, video analysis, and analysis of open-source weapon specifications.
   1. We photomatched photographs documenting the tree which was used as protection from the gunfire by Shireen and Shatha, and the bullet impact points which can be seen in its trunk in our 3D model ‎(5.6). These also appear in the photogrammetry model in their precise positions. In analysing the photographs of the tree at the site of the incident, we identified four bullet impact points at a close distance to one another.
   Photomatched image of the tree with 4 bullet marks. (Forensic Architecture and Al-Haq, 2022)

    

   2. We reconstructed Ali’s position by referencing two sources; the first and primary source was Ali’s testimony of where he was standing when he felt he was shot. The second source was arrived at through the interpolation between two confirmed and modelled positions: one when the first round of shooting began at 06:31:06 from ‘16 min video’; and one after the first round of shooting ended, when we see Ali running to a car at 6:31:13 in the ‘Al Jazeera’ video.
   3. We confirmed that the position he testified to be in when he was shot is consistent with being between the two confirmed and modelled positions before and after the shooting that we reconstructed from the footage. His movement between these two positions also provides an account of his body’s rotation. We increased the precision of his position by studying photographs of his injury then positioning the modelled figure representing Ali, so that his wound location and the modelled trajectory from the Israeli army marksman align in direction.
   4. To locate the impact point that hit Shireen, we first photomatched a still from ‘Al Jazeera’ at 6:31:37, after Shireen was shot and had fallen on the ground. From this match in the model, we modelled the precise position of Shireen on the ground. This model allowed us to recreate Shireen’s approximate standing location when she was shot, by positioning a standing figure at the feet of her fallen position. We further refined Shireen’s position and the impact point by analysing the autopsy to precisely establish the points where the bullet entered and exited Shireen’s head. We adjusted the position of the figure representing Shireen and the trajectory line from the Israeli army marksman so that they aligned in direction, thus creating an accurate model of the moment she was fatally shot.
   5. Locating the impact points of the tree on the site directly adjacent to where Shireen was shot, the impact point that hit Ali, and the point where Shireen was shot, all allowed us to draw trajectory lines of the shots between those points and the Israeli armoured vehicle. These reconstructed shot trajectory lines demonstrate a clear line of fire from the Israeli army vehicle sniper hole.
   6. We modelled the markings of the six identified impact points out of the 16 shots fired. Using the 3D model, we projected these impact point markings onto a flat orthographic surface projection perpendicular to the trajectories of the shots, to study the distance between the impact points.
   7. Specifications of the rifle state the M4 Carbine rifle has a shot deviation of 12 cm per 100 m.¹⁸ At 190 meters, which is well within the range of efficiency recommended for these rifles, the shots can therefore deviate 23 cm from the target of aim. In analysing the proximity and aim of the shots, we drew a circle with a 23 cm radius around each shot to reveal the possible area of aim for each shot. The radiuses of four of the six shots overlap, therefore indicating common areas of possible aim. Two of the six shots on the tree are less than 5 cm apart in impact.
   8. The proximity of the documented impact points thus reveals precise and careful aim of shots fired over the course of three rounds.
2. All shots were fired above shoulder height and indicate an intention to kill.
   1. The projection of confirmed that the shots’ impact points (as explained in ‎7.2.1.6-‎7.2.1.8) are positioned above the shoulder height of Ali, Shireen and the rest of the journalists. We determined this by projecting the outline of Shireen and Ali in their reconstructed positions when they were shot onto an orthographic plane and comparing them with the locations of the shots. Journalists’ vests are armoured, and therefore, shots fired above shoulder height are intended to kill because they are aimed at areas of the body which are less protected, like the neck and the lower half of the head.
By projecting the gunshots onto a single plane, set against the locations of Ali and Shireen when they were shot, we were able to demonstrate the precision and proximity of the shots and their consistent positioning at above-shoulder height, indicating intent to kill. (Forensic Architecture and Al-Haq, 2022)

 

3. A field of vision analysis simulating the view from the rifle scope reveals that shots were only fired when journalists, and later a civilian, were within the line of sight of the Israeli army marksman.
   1. We used the 3D reconstruction of the site to define the field of vision available to the marksman from the armoured vehicle’s left sniper hole. We did that by extending the cone of vision from the marksman’s scope and studying what would be visible and what would hidden within the marksman’s view cone (also known as ‘white shadows’) by different obstructions such as buildings, walls, vehicles, and trees. We did this by first creating a 3D grid of points 5cm apart within the view cone and then extending rays from the marksman’s rifle scope to each point. We wrote an algorithm processed in the Houdini modelling software that analyses the intersections of these rays (lines of sight) with objects in the 3D model. Rays that do not intersect with any object in the model indicate a clear line of vision to a particular point. These unobstructed lines of vision form what we refer to as the marksman’s field of vision.

   Play Video

    

   2. Based on the reconstruction of the marksman’s field of vision described above, we studied the possible relations between the timing of the shots and the presence of the journalists, and later a civilian, within the marksman’s view. This analysis shows that the marksman fired shots only when these individuals were within their field of vision.
      1. This is especially clear when a civilian, Sharif, attempts to reach and provide first aid to Shireen. Our field of vision analysis clearly indicates that the three shots fired at Sharif while attempting to provide aid to Shireen happened immediately after he enters the field of vision of the marksman. No shots were fired when Sharif and Shatha were hiding behind the tree and outside the marksman’s field of vision (See video below, also section 6 for detailed timeline).
   Play Video

    

   3. Video synchronisation reveals three distinct rounds of fire, which continued as the journalists sought shelter and attempted to run and seek cover.
      1. In the synchronised combined footage of ‘Al Jazeera’ and ’16 min video’ we were able to analyse and distinguish each shot fired. The audio and acoustic analysis confirms 16 shots fired from the Israeli army position across three distinct rounds of fire. The first round contained six shots, the second round, seven: and the third round, three shots. (See Audio and Acoustic Report by Dr. Lawrence Abu Hamdan)
4. During the second round of fire, the shooting likely continued until Shireen was hit, supporting the assessment that she was the target of this round.
   1. In ’16 min video’ we identified the last time Shireen is seen standing at 6:31:18, after the second round of shooting began with one shot having already been fired.
   2. We modelled the position of Shireen at this moment and compared it to where she fell to the ground. The distance between her position after the first shot of the second round and her position when she was shot was 3 meters. The last shot of the second round was fired just 1.5 seconds after Shireen is seen alive, which is the last possible shot to hit Shireen. The distance travelled by Shireen before she was shot makes it likely she was hit in one of the last three shots of the second round of shooting because of the time required to cross that distance.
   3. That Shireen was likely hit in one of the last three shots of the second round supports the assessment that the Israeli army marksman continued firing until Shireen was hit and that she was the target of this round.

1. Video analysis confirms there were no other persons present between the journalists and the convoy of military vehicles at the time of the incident.
   
   Video analysis confirms there were no other persons present between the journalists and the convoy of military vehicles at the time of the incident.
   1. Four videos capture the street between the journalists and the Israeli army position, including the military vehicles, in the moments shortly before and after the incident. These videos are ’16 min video,’ which captures the entire street 3 minutes before the incident; ‘Telegram_Jenin_Vehicles 1’ which captures the street and military convoy around 2 minutes before the incident; ‘Balcony video 01’ which captures the military vehicles approximately 9 minutes before the incident; and ‘Balcony video 02’ which captures the area around the military vehicles approximately 16 minutes after the incident. All these located videos were timed according to metadata and shadow analysis (‎5.6). All these videos demonstrate that no others were present between the military vehicles and the journalists.
2. Witness testimony confirms that there were no other persons between the journalists and the convoy of military vehicles at the time of the incident.
   1. We went to the site of the incident with Shatha Hanaysha and interviewed her about the incident. We marked several known locations of her person at different stages of the incident and asked her to fill in the gap of what happened between those known positions and times. This allowed for a better memory recollection and more accurate testimony. We started by asking Shatha about what she observed as she was standing at the end of the road with Mujahid al-Saadi and leading up to the moments of the first round of shooting. Shatha confirmed she did not see anyone between them (the journalists and some civilians) and the Israeli army position. She also said that they did not hear any gunfire nor see any fighters or fighting near them at any point; and that if they had, they would not have walked in the direction of the Israeli army position. The following is a quote included in our accompanying video report:

      “Until we started moving, there weren’t any gunshots heard, even from afar. There weren’t any gunshots near us, something that would scare us away; the situation was very calm.”

3. Sound analysis of videos of the incident confirms that the only shots fired in the three minutes preceding the shooting of Shireen came from the Israeli army’s position. 
   Audio analysis of the videos capturing the incident allowed us to compare the sound signatures of all shots fired during and preceding the incident and trace them back to the IOF marksman’s position. In the two minutes before the shooting begins, no shots are fired at all. No other shots in any of the footage analysed came from the vicinity of the journalists. (Forensic Architecture and Al-Haq, 2022)
   1. See section 2 in the accompanying Audio and Acoustic Analysis Report.
4. No other shots in any of the footage analysed came from the vicinity of the journalists.
   1. See 2.3, 3.5, and 4.4 in the accompanying Audio and Acoustic Analysis Report for an analysis of the shots before during and after the incident.
5. Analysis of the journalists’ movements suggest they felt safe enough to walk slowly towards the military vehicles.
   1. ’16 min video’ captures Ali and Shireen beginning to walk slowly toward the Israeli army position at 6:30:49. Ali says, at 6:30:43, that they “will walk directly in their direction” to make themselves clearly visible and identifiable.
   2. We see in the same video that Shireen, Ali, Shatha, Mujahid, Muhannan, and Majdi are slowly walking toward the Israeli army position spread apart and slowly, before the first round of shooting begins at 6:31:06. This confirms Shatha’s testimony that they were calm and unafraid as they walked.

1. Video, audio and spatial analysis confirms that while attempting to provide aid to Shireen, Sharif, a civilian on the scene was shot at each time he attempted to reach her and entered the line of sight/fire of the Israeli army shooter.
   1. From our footage synchronization, we see in ‘Al Jazeera’ that at 6:33:12, Sharif approaches Shireen after she was shot and had fallen to the ground. As soon as Sharif approaches her, there is a shot from the Israeli army position toward him, at 6:33:19. Sharif runs for cover and helps Shatha Hanaysha leave the scene. At 6:33:38, when Sharif approaches Shireen again to aid her, he is shot at by the Israeli army two more times, at 6:33:42 and 6:33:44. (see section ‎6 for a detailed timeline).
   2. We can confirm, through audio analysis, these shots are coming from the same place as shots fired in the first and second rounds.
   3. We modelled Sharif’s at the moments of the three shots fired at him, as well as two positions when he sought cover (see ‎5.6.2. for modelling positions method). We compared these modelled positions with the field of vision analytical model which demonstrates that the Israeli army marksman deliberately denied Shireen first aid (as explained in ‎7.2.3 and ‎5.6).

1. Situation in the State of Palestine (investigation): This is an international criminal investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity, Al-Haq and partners, Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Al Mezan and Al Dameer, have submitted eight substantial communications to the Office of the Prosecutor. On 16 March 2020, the Palestinian human rights organisations Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR), Al-Haq Law in the Service of Man (Al-Haq), Al Mezan Center for Human Rights (Al Mezan), and Al-Dameer Association for Human Rights (Al-Dameer) submitted their joint observations to the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
2. Salah Hammouri v NSO Group (5 April 2022): The case of Salah Hammouri v NSO Group is a criminal case, involving a breach of the right to privacy of Salah Hammouri under French law. The criminal complaint is against the Israeli company NSO Pegasus spyware used to infiltrate French- Palestinian human rights defender Salah Hammouri’s phone. The case is being conducted in France and an investigation has been opened in Paris. Al-Haq has supported with joint work with Citizen Lab, and also more broadly with campaign materials.
3. MF Case: Between January and February 2022, in the case of the case of MF (March 2022) Al-Haq contributed materials and proofed a filing for accuracy of apartheid arguments, before an Immigration Tribunal in the UK. On 4 March 2022, a United Kingdom (UK) based immigration tribunal allowed the appeal of a 22-year-old Haredi Jewish rabbinical student from Israel on the basis that returning him to Israel would subject him to inhuman and degrading treatment by the Israeli authorities. The Tribunal based its findings on the likelihood that the client ‘MF’ would suffer a serious relapse of his mental health condition should the UK authorities return him to Israel.  The evidence of an existing apartheid regime practiced by the State of Israel against the Palestinian people inlcuded reports from Al-Haq, amongst others.  
4. David Mivasair And Khaled Mouammar v. The Canadian Zionist Cultural Association (January 2022): On 11 January 2022, Mivasair and Mouammmar, the complainants, submitted an addendum to the legal complaint they had submitted in July 2022 to the Compliance Division of the Charities Directorate of the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). In the complaint, the plaintiffs requested an audit of the Canadian Zionist Cultural Association (CZCA), under well-grounded allegations of use of charitable funds for the benefit of the Israeli Occupation Forces, in violation of Canadian law. Al-Haq had supported the submission of the complaint by highlighting evident and systematic breaches of international law in the course of the Israeli military operations, which resulted in serious war crimes and crimes against humanity.
5. Lawyers for Palestinian Human Rights complaint to the UK NCP about JC Bamford Excavators Limited (January 2021): On 12 November 2021, the British construction equipment company, JCB, was found by a UK Government body to be in breach of its human rights responsibilities under the government-backed OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Al-Haq along with B’Tselem; and the UK charity, EyeWitness to Atrocities submitted video, photographic and written contemporaneous evidence to substantiate the material and prolific use of JCB products in a number of specific demolition and displacement incidents, and in settlement-related construction.
6. CAGE Judicial Review (September 2021): In September 2021, Al-Haq provided a supporting legal opinion, on whether any State can claim a “right” to exist under international law, for a judicial review case High Court Challenge in the United Kingdom. In particular, Al-Haq argued that the notion of Israel’s “right to exist” is a partisan political view that the Education Secretary is prohibited from promoting in any way under the 1996 Education Act.
7. Prosecutor v HeidlebergCement: In August 2021, Al-Haq along with Guernica37 and Global Echo filed a petition to the German Prosecutor on the complicity of corporate agents in the case of HeidlebergCement. The filing followed a number of years research on the company including the publication of a comprehensive report Violations Set in Stone and submissions to the UN Database on businesses active in the Israeli settlements, UN Special Procedures, and exchange at the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre.
8. Attorney General of Canada v. R. David Kattenburg and Psagot Winery Ltd. (May 2021): In March 2017, Jewish-Canadian human rights activist Dr. David Kattenburg filed a complaint with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) claiming it was inappropriate for wines produced in illegal Israeli settlements to be labelled “Product of Israel”. The CFIA initially agreed, but then reversed its decision and continued to allow such labels, citing the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement (CIFTA)’s definition of Israeli “territory,” which includes areas where Israel’s custom laws apply, such as settlements in the OPT.This case is an appeal of a judicial review, of an administrative decision by the CFIA’s Complaints and Appeals Office (CAO), on labelling. The Appeal took place in Canada, and after decision was reverted back to the administrative body. Al-Haq filed to submit a joint legal amicus and submitted field research to the lawyers for the petition.
9. CERD Inter State Complaint, State of Palestine v Israel (11 April 2021): Al-Haq drafted an amicus submission signed onto by the Palestinian Human Rights Organisations Council (PHROC), which was submitted to the Inter State Complaint to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, between the State of Palestine and Israel under the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
10. Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (December 2020). Al-Haq contributed research from the Climate Change Adaptation under Occupation: Climate Change Vulnerability in the Occupied Palestinian Territory which was referenced as authority in the ESCR.net amicus submission. Al-Haq carried out joint work on the amicus in a climate change case against Portugal at the European Court of Human Rights.
11. Al-Haq sent a formal complaint to the Dutch National Public Prosecutor’s Office in Rotterdam, the Netherlands in 2010 against a Dutch company, Riwal, involved in war crimes and crimes against humanity.¹⁹ The complaint that was submitted against Riwal was the result of the culmination of months of investigations and evidence-gathering by Al-Haq and partner organisations. Witness statements from those directly affected by Riwal’s activities were taken. The military orders used to appropriate land for the building of the Wall, aerial photographs, maps, film footage and photographs of Riwal’s activities were also collected. On 13 October 2010, the Dutch National Crime Squad conducted a search of Riwal’s offices in the Dutch town of Dordrecht under their statutory powers of investigation.
12. R (Saleh Hasab) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (2007): Al-Haq, as a partner, took part in the case of R (Saleh Hasab) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry at the UK High Court of Justice in London in 2007, United Kingdom.²⁰ A full public hearing was held before the UK High Court of Justice in London on 10 -11 October 2007 following the blanket refusal by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to respond to the claimant’s request for a justification of UK policy on arms-related sales to Israel. The High Court heard arguments in a claim filed on 15 November 2006 by UK Solicitor Phil Shiner of Public Interest Lawyers (PIL), in cooperation with Al-Haq.

Refer to Al-Haq’s website for a full list of Al-Haq’s activities, engagements, and submissions.